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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
C!!\P

<JF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 19091

-vL. LENZING,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with attempted criminal
nornicide, a second degree felony,
Ann.
felony,

76-5-201

in violation of Utah Code

( 1978), aggravated robbery, a

first degree

in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1978),

carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a Class "B"
misdemeanor,

in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504

!lg78), as amended.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After a

jury trial on February 28, March 1 and 2,

igs3, appellant was convicted on all charges in the Third
Judicial District Court of Utah before the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson.

The

trial judge sentenced appellant to the

1nrleterminate term of not less than 1 nor more than 5 years at
the lltah state Prison for
r,.-,m1r1r1e;

the

the crime of attempted criminal

indeterminate term of not less than 5 years to

lite at the Utah State Prison for the crime of aggravated

robbery; and the

indeterminate term of

from O to 6 months

at

the Utah State Prison for the crime of carrying a
dangerous weapon,

those sentences to run concurrently.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the

judgment and sentence below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 9, 1982 at approximately 4 :00 p.m., ,Jae'
P. Hillard, a transient and sometime sheepherder (T.

8, 9, 10,

41), returned from selling plasma to his campsite near Roper
Yards at 3000 South 500 West in South Salt Lake City, lltah IT.
5, 44).

Shortly thereafter,

appellant and another individual

arrived at Mr. Hillard's campsite (T. 7, 8).
appellant conversed for a
slept (T. 11).

Mr. Hillard and

few minutes and the third person

Appellant asked Mr. Hillard where his partner,

Bill Southworth, was.

Mr.

Hillard replied that Mr.

had not yet returned fran selling plasma (T.

Southworth

12).

A few minutes later, Mr. Hillard felt something in
his back and turned to find appellant stabbing him (T.
Mr.

13).

Hillard reached for his back and connected with

appellant's butcher knife and hand.
the knife out of his back

(T. 14).
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Mr. Hillard tried to pull
Appellant next stabbed Mr

, 11

1

the right chest area.

in

Lint

11

r cid \'

( T.

When Mr. Hillard asked

if he was trying to kill him,
16 '

17 ,

appellant made no

29 ) •

Mr. Hillard was stabbed a third time by appellant on
the

left side of his stomach (T.

t1• the ground,
0

17).

After Mr. Hillard fell

appellant went through his pockets and

tr111Jglec1 to get Mr. Hillard's watch off his wrist, saying

that

he had to get it off (T. 21, 22).

recovered.

The watch has not been

Appellant stabbed Mr. Hillard a fourth time,

thnugh he has no recollection of that fourth stab (T. 30,
l 2'> ) •

As a result of this unprovoked attack, Mr. Hillard
suffe reel a collapsed lung and lost 11 pints of blood, his left
kidney, his spleen, and part of his pancreas and small
intestine (T.

138, 143, 144).

One wound came within fractions

,,fan inch of piercing Mr. Hillard's heart (T. 139).
A" "bout 5:30 p.m., Bill Southworth, Mr. Hillard's
partner, retul'.ned to their campsite. He found Mr. Hillard on
thf' grounrl,

bleeding.

Mr. Southworth called the police, who

arrived along with paramedics shortly thereafter.

Officer Leo

Lindsay of the South Salt Lake Police Department assisted the
paramedics and then questioned Mr.

Southworth (T. 101, 102).

Mr. Southworth reported that Mr. Hillard's green backpack
3f•rear,,,1 to he missing from the campsite (T. 91, 105).
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Officer Lindsay walked along the railroad tracks
another hobo campsite at 3350 South (T.

105).

tr

He found

appellant and two other men, one of whom had passed out (T.
106).

Officer Lindsay observed a green backpack behind

appellant and asked him if
(T.

it was his.

Appellant said it was

108 l.
Officer Lindsay noticed blood on appellant's left

side and coat.

Appellant slowly moved the pack out of the

officer's view with his left hand and moved his right hand
under his jacket.

Upon seeing this, Officer Lindsay brushed

open appellant's coat and found

a knife in a sheath, stuck in

appellant's belt (T. 108, 109).

Officer Lindsay arrested and

handcuffed appellant and walked with him several blocks
through a

field

to the officer's patrol car (T. 110, 117).

sobriety tests were given to appellant

No

(T. 117, 180).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED BECAUSE APPELLANT MAKES NO
REFERENCE TO THE RECORD SUPPORTING HIS
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
In State v. Tucker, Utah, 657 P. 2d 755 ( 1982), this
Court affirmed the trial court's judgment
appellant's failure

in part due to the

to make any reference to the record in hie

-4-

otat»ment of the facts:
A separate and independent basis for
the affirmance of the trial court is that
the defendant failed to refer to any
port ion of the record that factually
supports his contentions on appeal.
This
Court will assume the correctness of the
judgment below if counsel on appeal does
not comply with the requirements of Rule
75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, as to making a concise
statement of facts and citation of the
pages in the record where they are
supported.
Jd. at 756-757, citing Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359,
,'42 P.2d

297 (1957).

See also State v. Vigil, Utah, 661 P.2d

947, 948 (1983); State v. Steggell, Utah, 660 P.2d 252, 253
Ilg 83).

Appellant fails to refer to the record to support
any of his factual statements.

Thus, he has violated Rule 75

lpl12ll2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the trial
court's Judgment

should be affirmed on that basis alone.

POINT II
THE STATE'S EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH THAT APPELLANT COMMITTED THE
OFFENSE WITH THE REOUISITE INTENT.
Appellant contends that his intoxicated condition
prevented him from forming the requisite intent necessary for
the commission of attempted criminal homicide.
'

7f>-2-3nh ( 1978) provides

in pertinent part:

-5-

Utah Code Ann.

Voluntary intoxication shall not he a
defense to a criminal charge unless such
intoxication negates the existence of the
mental state which is an element of an
offense .
Appellant was convicted of attempted criminal
homicide in violation of Utah Code Ann.

76-5-201 (19781.

Although criminal homicide covers various mental states, the
requisite mental state for the attempted criminal homicide
charged in this case was that appellant

intentionally or

knowingly attempted to cause the death of another.
A person acts intentionally when it is his consciocs
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or to cause the
result; a person acts knowingly when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
Code

76-2-103 (1) and (2)

(1978).

See Utah

In State v. Murphy,

Utah, 674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1983), this Court stated with
reference to proof of intent:
[I]ntent need not be proved by direct
evidence.
It- may be inferred from the
actions of the defendant or from
surrounding circumstances.
The instant case is similar to the case of State \',
Bush, Utah, 646 P.2d 748 (1982).

In Bush, the defendant,

while under the influence of alcohol,

kidnapped several

people, stole two cars, shot at one of the passengers in the

-6-

he was driving, and engaged in a high speed chase with
11
1

ce tiefore crashing and being apprehended.

Two of those

lnap!krl testified that during the ordeal the defendant spoke

,oherently and followed directions without difficulty, despite
rµferring to himself as a drunk-crazed murderer.

The judge in

a verdict of guilty of aggravated kidnapping,
attemptPrl homicide and aggravated robbery.
This Court noted that while the defendant may have
heen intoxicated the evidence of his ability to communicate
and make decisions was sufficient for the trial court to
crJnclude that he was capable of forming the requisite intent
fnr the crimes with which he was charged.
1erdict of the factfinder was affirmed.

1

Therefore, the
See also State v.

<isneros, Utah, 631 P. 2d 856 ( 1981).
On the facts presented in the present case, the
iury, as trier of fact, could reasonably conclude appellant's
intoxication did not negate his intent.
been drinking,

Although appellant

he was coherent and could understand and

fol low instruct ions.
At trial, Mr. Hillard said that appellant had been
rlrinking, but was not
'•h'

1

intoxicated

harl been trained to spot

'ieen "irinking, but was not
''lPs, and was able
' " d s unassisted

(T.

Officer Lindsay

intoxication, said appellant had

intoxicated, did not have bloodshot

to walk through a
(T.

42).

field and across railroad

113, 116, 117, 129, 130, 200).

-7-

Officer Melvin Long testified that appellant had
been drinking, but was not drunk (T.

201).

Finally, Ser'J'"ant

James Foster was of the opinion that appellant appeared t,, r""
intoxicated, but admitted having had very litte verbal ccintad
with him.
While there appears to be some discrepancy in the
testimonies of Officers Lindsay and Long and Sergeant Foster
as to whether or not appellant was

intoxicated, this was a

question for the

See State v. Mccullar,

jury to resolve.

Utah, 674 P.2d 117, 118 (1983), where the Court said that
"judging the credibility of the witnesses and weight of the
evidence is exclusively the prerogative of the jury."
The accounts of appellant's degree of intoxication
are similar to those given in State v. Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 7;
( 1982), where this Court held that the defendant was not
entitled to an instruct ion on

intoxication.

Although there

was evidence that the defendant had been drinking, there was
no evidence that he was so intoxicated at the time of the
crime that he was unable to form the

intent necessary to prove

robbery.
This Court said in Wood, 648 P. 2d at 90,

that in

order for the defendant successfully to use the defense of
intoxication,

it would have been necessary to show that his

mind had been affected to such an extent that he did not have
the capacity to form the

requisite intent.

shown that there was such a significant

-8-

Appellant has not

impact on his capacit,

1 ,,

reasnn,
ldnt

,

,,

0

in the
had

instant case.

There is evidence that

been drinking, but no evidence that it affected

r11l1ty to form the

necessary intent.

The voluntary intoxication of appellant was not so
pervasive as

to negate the required

intent for attempted

er un i n a 1 h om i c i de •

POINT III
THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE T0
SUSTAIN THE VERDICT OF GUILTY OF
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery in
'Jiolation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-302 (1978).

That statute

reads in pertinent part:

(1)
A person commits aggravated robbery
if in the course of committing robbery,
he:
(a) Uses a firearm or facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife
or a deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
( 3)
For the purposes of this part, an act
sh al 1 be deemed to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission
of, or in the immediate flight after the
attempt or commission of a robbery.
The State proved the elements of aggravated robbery at trial.

Appellant

stabbed Mr. Hillard with a knife which caused the

,,,, 1rn serious bodily injury (T. 15, 136-146).
-i 1 1 Pt'

Immediately

Stilhbing Mr. Hillard, appellant went through the

-9-

victim's pockets and
was found

took his watch

(T.

20,

21).

MnnPy that

in possess ion of appellant had blood on it and "'"'

similar in denomination to that which Mr. Hillard had in hi,
pockets prior to the stabbing

incident

(T.

62, 173, 17q, 231,

2 3 2).

The

last time Mr. Hillard had seen his green pacf,

was prior to the stabbing, when it was

in his camp (T.

When Mr. Southworth arrived at the campsite,
missing

(T.

91).

341.

the backpack was

The next time the pack was seen it was in

the possession of appellant, who cla"imed it was his and trie,J
to hide it from Officer Lindsay {T. 108, 109).
In State v. Mccullar, 674 P.2d at 118, this Court
said that it would not overturn the

jury's verdict "unless t,oe

admissible evidence produced at trial

is so lacking and

unsubstantial that reasonable minds must necessarily entertain
a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt."
question that Mr.

There is no

Hillard was stabbed and seriously wounderl

with a knife by appellant.

Mr. Hillard's pack was seen in

camp just prior to appellant's attack.
thereafter in appellant's possession.
it was not unreasonable for the

I t was

hl'

found shortly

Based on this evidence,

jury to believe that the pao,

was taken by appellant after he stabbed Mr. Hillard.
Appellant might contend that such reasoning convict'
him on circumstantial evidence.
v. Clayton, Utah, 646 P.2d 723,

However, as noted
725

(1982),

"circumstantial

evidence alone may be competent to establish the guilt of

-10-

t\f

'J"c

Thus, there was sufficient evidence to sustain

! "

'i eel L1

nt 's conviction of aggravated robbery.

CONCLUSION
There was sufficient evidence presented by the State
to sustain the conviction of attempted criminal homicide.
;rrel la nt,
ihP

though somewhat intoxicated, was capable of forming

rPquisite intent for this crime.

s u ff i c i e nt

The State's evidence was

to sustain a verdict of guilty of aggravated

rubbery.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

of July, 1984.
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